The European Union (EU) has a long tradition of interregional dialogue mechanisms with other regional organisations and is using these relations to project its own model of institutionalised actorness. This is partly motivated by the emerging actorness of the EU itself, which benefits from fostering capable regional counterparts in other parts of the world. This article advances the argument that actorness, which we conceptualise in terms of institutions, recognition and identity, is a relational concept, dependent on context and perception. The formation of such differences has narrowed the scope of EU interregionalism despite the initial success of improved regional actorness.
Introduction
Recent years have seen an increasing proliferation of scholarship on cohesion and effectiveness of regional organisations as international actors (Delreux, 2014; Oberthür and Groen, 2015; Peters, 2016) . Most of this literature focuses on the European Union, leaving the evolving actorness of other regional organisations largely under-explored (for exceptions see Wunderlich, 2012; Murau and Spandler, 2016) . This article argues that the actorness of the EU itself is ultimately linked to and even dependent on the emergence of so-called "regional others" (Gilson 2005) , i.e. regional organisations with actorness features. Actorness is a relational concept, not exclusively determined by endogenous factors such as material endowments, but also dependent on context and recognition. This focus on external recognition contributes to explaining the longstanding EU support for the strengthening of the institutional capabilities of other regional organisations. In terms of enhancing EU actorness, interregionalism has two potential advantages. First, the emergence of other regional actors makes the EU less exceptional by overcoming the n=1 problem. It normalises the EU and generates greater levels of acceptance in global governance forums by creating comparable International organisations may have struggled in the past to be recognised as negotiation partners in international relations. Yet, this is not necessarily the case anymore: Participation in global governance forums as well as relations with other actors regularly confer de jure and de facto recognition to regional organisations and other non-state actors.
Several scholars have noted the importance of inter-subjective aspects of identity for actorness ( Hettne, 2011 ( Hettne, , 2014 Doidge, 2007; Wunderlich, 2012; Söderbaum, 2016) . It is a social category that is informed by constitutive norms (formal and informal rules), social purposes (shared goals), relational comparisons (defining group identity by what it is not, i.e. organisations create a platform for mutual interaction, attaining international presence and recognition in the process. It is important that this is not a one-time event. The emphasis is on continuous mutual recognition and interaction in order to cement actorness. Hence, enhancing the actorness of other regional organisations is woven into the EU's desire to be recognised as an actor itself. This can take the form of supporting regional organisations elsewhere via capacity-building or of the export and projection of its own institutional and normative preferences (Manners, 2002; Börzel and Risse, 2012) . Alternatively, it can occur as the result of institutional copying, with or without an active role of the EU. These issues will be discussed in some more detail below, focusing first on EC/EU-ASEAN relations followed by EU-Mercosur relations.
collective will of its member states, their perceived national interests, and peer pressure to ensure compliance with its agreements and decisions" (Asian Development Bank, 2010: 125) . This has put constraints on ASEAN's institutionalisation and actorness.
The EC/ EU has directly and indirectly impacted on ASEAN's institutional structure by offering declaratory and material support through capacity-building measures such as the Institutional Development Programme for the ASEAN Secretariat (IDPAS), the ASEAN Programme for Regional Integration Support (APRIS and APRIS II) and the current ASEAN Regional Integration Support from the EU (ARISE).
5 More indirectly, European integration functioned as a model (Hwee, 2008; Jetschke, 2009 This ideational core can be traced back to ASEAN's foundational rationale to create an environment conducive to state-building by "promoting regional peace and stability" (ASEAN, 1967) . This common purpose is expressed in the so-called ASEAN way, a set of constitutive norms centred on the non-use of force in intra-regional disputes, non-interference and regional autonomy (Acharya, 2009; Haacke, 2003) . 6 It has created a web of norms into which ASEAN's members are sought to be socialized (Jones, 2010: 480) and which informs not only the self-understanding of the ASEAN grouping but also shapes its mode of institutionalisation. ASEAN's identity has continuously evolved through its international relations and interactions. The resurgence and increasing proliferation of regional arrangements in the 1990s has also led to a new level of interregional relations such as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) (Baert et al., 2014: 4) . Through ASEM, the EU and ASEAN have both gained in recognition and visibility. For example, the Commission participates alongside its member-states positioning itself and, by extension, the EU, as a relevant actor within ASEM. ASEM has also helped to further the notion of ASEAN actorness through a series of coordinating mechanisms whereby ASEAN members frequently act as a group (Stubbs, 2002: 442) . And, like the Commission, the participation of the ASEAN Secretariat within ASEM reinforces the notion of ASEAN as an international actor.
In the post-Cold War era the EU has placed an increasingly high priority on norms associated with good governance, human rights and market economy in its external relations (Manners, 2002) . This 'awakening' of EU normative power offered potential for conflict with ASEAN for whose member-states democracy and human rights played, at best, a marginal role. There and Thailand (European Commission, 2013) . While this enhances the presence and visibility of the EU in the region, it is also sidelining ASEAN as a grouping.
Mercosur-EU relations
Mercosur was set up in 1991 to promote trade and democracy, and to overcome the rivalry between countries in the Southern cone of South America. Apart from the main axis of Brazil-Argentina it also encompasses Uruguay and Paraguay as founding members as well as
Venezuela (2012) 11 The financing mainly goes to local infrastructure or social expenditures. 12 For 2013, Brazil contributed over 80 % to the budget while almost 90 % of the funds were intended to go to Paraguay and Uruguay (Mercosur, 2012) . However, the current domestic budget crisis could reduce the financial leverage of Brazil.
13 Uruguay is the country with the highest income per capita in the region and is therefore less in need of financial support to catch up with the region but it remains a major recipient. Brazil is bound to negotiate trade agreements within Mercosur and requires Uruguay's endorsement for its global trade ambitions. Uruguayan perception of power asymmetries in favour of Brazil have led to discontent and threats to leave Mercosur for closer alignment with the US.
EU support to Mercosur's capacity naturally puts the institutional component of actorness into the limelight. Mercosur having incorporated emblematic elements from the EU underlines the importance of the latter's repertoire of formalised and institutionalised models.
However, it has only adopted elements that are neither legally binding nor reflect 
Interregionalism and actorness -an ambivalent relationship
The EU has invested considerable resources and time in establishing and maintaining relations with both ASEAN and Mercosur. This interregionalism has in part been driven by a desire to export its own version of regional actorness. The EU regards itself as the purveyor of certain norms and principles, among them a model of successful regional integration, which might not always reflect reality (Fioramonti and Mattheis, 2016) . This outreach is facilitated by the desire of governments in the developing world to enhance their standing and legitimacy by incorporating parts of the institutional structure of the EU into their regional projects (Börzel and Risse, 2009: 9) .
Interregional dialogue has created a space for all three groupings to interact, to recognise each other and to be recognised -in short, to be actors. ASEAN-EC/EU and Mercosur-EU relations can look back at several decades, making it a good opportunity to take stock how it has affected the regional projects. Our two case studies highlighted the ambiguities of the mutual influence between interregionalism and the three different elements of actorness.
In terms of institutionalisation, we find that interregionalism has produced approximation but also resistance. There is evidence of echoing in both cases: ASEAN and Mercosur have acquired elements of actorness and relations with the EU having played an important role in this process. The EU has directly and indirectly supported institutional capacity-building measures, thereby aiming to explicitly position itself and its partners as international actors.
Furthermore, the asymmetrical nature of EU interregionalism has fostered institutional learning and socialisation in both relationships (Doidge, 2014) . The same asymmetry also strengthened ASEAN and Mercosur group cohesion. Faced with a more institutionalised and more coherent partner, ASEAN and Mercosur members were incentivised to work more closely together. For example, it pushed ASEAN to enhanced coordination and cohesion prior to ASEM summits (Fitriani, 2014: 50) . However, ASEAN and Mercosur seem to only superficially mimic the institutional structure of the EU in order to gain international recognition (Jetschke, 2009; Dri, 2011) . Indeed, interregional relations with the EU have very much helped to accentuate and to entrench a normative core that sets limits to institutional capacity in both ASEAN and Mercosur. In turn, the EU's institutionalisation has also been consolidated. Interregionalism has given the EU a continuous task to perform and to professionalise with considerable autonomy. This has sustained a leadership role of regional institutions over member-states.
There is also evidence that identity-building has happened, for example through relational EU's identity has also been strengthened through these relations by reinforcing the notion of EU norms and interests to be fostered abroad.
Lastly, in terms of recognition, the EU's motivation to engage with Mercosur and ASEAN is twofold. First, it is enhancing its own standing as an international actor not only within Southeast Asia and Latin America but also globally. EU actorness partly relies on the existence of regional organisations modelled along similar institutional lines. The EU thus creates platforms for interactions between regional actors for the purpose of strengthening recognition and presence on both sides. The second motivation is the EU's normative commitment that functioning regional institutions facilitate peace and prosperity.
Importantly, this also includes a belief in a duty to actively export its own institutional model in order to positively influence the global order (Hettne, 2007) . In turn, Mercosur and ASEAN partly mimic EU norms and institutions, not only because they are globally regarded as the most advanced model of regional actorness but also thanks to the exposure to and creation of knowledge of European integration. EU-style institutions confer prestige and credibility, especially when dealing with the EU itself. Through interregionalism both sides are also able to gain recognition by third parties.EU interregionalism with ASEAN and Mercosur has thus yielded very modest results in terms of institutionalised actorness, and the EU has recognised the limitations of this strategy. Following the disappointing evolution of its funding programme, support to Mercosur was discontinued altogether in 2013 (Europe Direct, 2015) . Yet, abandoning the support for regionalism in general is hard to reconcile with how the EU sees itself and would like its partners to develop, especially since its own actorness benefits from interregionalism. Consequently, under the new Latin America programme Central America is still eligible for regional integration support despite the frustrations with Mercosur (European Commission, 2014a , 2014b . This perspective, however, may overemphasise the actorness of the EU itself. Rather than being a monolithic actor, the EU, like ASEAN and Mercosur, can be understood as a "composite international actor" (Santander, 2014) . The EU employs a diverse set of interregional relations which can be directed at states or regional organisations, issue-specific or multipurpose, and can link to global governance and multilateral structures. This picture is further complicated by the division of external competencies within the EU between different EU institutions and member-states. Thus, it is difficult to discern a common rationale underlying the various interregional contacts. They are based on different foundations, reflecting the nature of the regional states or groupings involved as well as the interest of the various actors lurking below EU level such as the Commission, the European Parliament, foreign ministries or lobby groups to name but a few (Fahey, 2016) . In Latin America and South-East Asia the lack of supranational bodies reduces the number of actors but much diversity remains due to the high number of regional projects and coalitions, though many are only temporary.
Whether EU interregionalism has failed to strengthen ASEAN and Mercosur actorness depends on perspective and expectations. Mercosur and ASEAN have enhanced their institutional structures and have gained in recognition and presence not least within their own regional context vis-a-vis competing projects. Interregionalism has also enhanced the identity consciousness of ASEAN and Mercosur, which ultimately determines form and function of institutionalisation. Interregionalism provides several opportunities to improve regional actorness but the ambitious expectations that have been associated with the engagements of the EU deserve to be met with caution. The EU still engages with Mercosur and ASEAN and both, in turn, are periodically turning to the EU for ideas and support but each attempt at interregionalism also exposes and accentuates differences. In sum, our research shows that interregionalism has an identifiable, though limited, impact on regional actorness. However, this should not be mistaken for a global alignment of the regional organisations. Instead, interregional exposure is encouraging the formation of discrete identities and institutions.
Brexit and Donald Trump's election as US president are indicative for political populism and economic nationalism that are challenging the liberal consensus across the world. This puts pressure on regional organisations such as the EU and challenges its main mode of interregionalism. The EU has already championed strategic partnerships with key states in specific regions around the globe. Such bilateral links between the EU as a region and individual countries could become an even more important template in the years ahead, not least to accommodate the UK and the US outside of a multilateral framework. However, interregionalism is likely to remain important thanks to its adaptable nature. It goes well beyond the relations between formal institutions, be that states or regional organisations. Far from being a static concept, interregionalism can include a much wider array of actors and structures than are the focus of this study. Further research on the EU's interregionalism needs to tackle the multiplex, porous and dynamic nature of regions in order to assess the whole range of connections between them. 
